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ABSTRACT
The proliferation of Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices has opened a plethora of opportu-
nities for smart networking, connected applications and data driven intelligence. The large
distribution of IoT devices within a finite geographical area and the pervasiveness of wireless
networking present an opportunity for such devices to collaborate. Centralized decision sys-
tems have so far dominated the field, but they are starting to lose relevance in the wake of
heterogeneity of the device pool. This thesis is driven by three key hypothesis: (i) In solving
complex problems, it is possible to harness unused compute capabilities of the device pool in-
stead of always relying on centralized infrastructures; (ii) When possible, collaborating with
neighbors to identify security threats scales well in large environments; (iii) Given the abun-
dance of data from a large pool of devices with possible privacy constraints, collaborative
learning drives scalable intelligence.
This dissertation defines three frameworks for these hypotheses; collaborative comput-
ing, collaborative security and collaborative privacy intelligence. The first framework, Op-
portunistic collaboration among IoT devices for workload execution, profiles applications and
matches resource grants to requests using blockchain to put excess capacity at the edge to
good use. The evaluation results show app execution latency comparable to the centralized
edge and an outstanding resource utilization at the edge. The second framework, Integrity
Threat Identification for Distributed IoT, uses a new spatio-temporal algorithm, based on
Local Outlier Factor (LOF) uniquely using mean and variance collaboratively across spa-
tial and temporal dimensions to identify potential threats. Evaluation results on real world
underground sensor dataset (Thoreau) show good accuracy and efficiency. The third frame-
work, Collaborative Privacy Intelligence, aims to understand privacy invasion by reverse
engineering a user’s privacy model using sensors data, and score the level of intrusion for
various dimensions of privacy. By having sensors track activities, and learning rule books
from the collective insights, we are able to predict ones privacy attributes and states, with
reasonable accuracy. As the Edge gains more prominence with computation moving closer
to the data source, the above frameworks will drive key solutions and research in areas of
Edge federation and collaboration.
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1PART 1
INTRODUCTION
Internet-of-Things (IoT) has created huge opportunities and challenges in compute,
security and our ability to drive intelligent insights with data from the fleet of heterogenous
devices. Collaboration among devices at the Edge in all these areas is the path forward
as we scale beyond the compute capabilities of centralized infrastructures and bandwidth
of networks. Collaboration in each of these areas mean the use of different resources or
intelligence. Collaboration on compute translates to sharing compute resources and services,
while collaboration in detecting security threats translates to sharing information about
context and federated learning implies driving decentralized intelligence with smaller subsets
of data in order to preserve data privacy. Lets explore each of these in more detail in the
sections below.
1.1 Collaborative Edge Computing
IoT is leading the way to a world of smart systems, applications and services powered
by mobile devices. Cloud based mobile IoT is paving the way for a large number of emerging
applications and computing platforms. One of the key challenges in realizing mobile IoT
systems using current day cloud solutions is the heavy dependence on centralized cloud
infrastructures. Such centralized solutions are necessary to address the large scale of IoT,
however, the performance of such systems degrade with the wireless network connectivity
between the device and the cloud. Also, with the growing need for data creation, access
and storage, the network backbones will be inundated with data if they try to handle every
IoT application and service request using centralized data centers. This dependency on a
centralized architecture can lead to performance degradation and eventually unreliability in
mobile IoT systems.
2We propose the idea of opportunistic collaboration among mobile IoT devices [1] to
share their services and excess computing resources. Opportunistic collaboration among
devices over wireless networking requires proper coordination and agreements among the
devices in a purely distributed manner. To facilitate the distributive collaboration, we pro-
pose a decentralized architecture design using blockchain technology. Through experimental
evaluation of a prototype collaborative mobile–IoT system involving RaspberryPis and a
Dell IoT edge gateway, we show that our proposed distributed collaborative approach is fea-
sible and comparable to a non–collaborative edge–computing based approach from a latency
perspective.
1.2 Collaborative Edge Security
As noted earlier, IoT paradigms have created, in addition to opportunities, a huge
void in security. Although there are multiple works that explore security through device
identification, cryptography and network security protocols, the question of can we trust the
integrity of things to represent reality or precisely, can we trust the data and the metrics
being sent by things, remains largely unanswered in distributed wireless scenarios. Given
the rapid pace of adoption of IoT, being able to trust data from each of these devices is
extremely important, but no systems exist today that can help us categorically state that
data from these devices can be trusted. Designing such a system is challenging given the
number of threat vectors and device types. Moreover, the problem becomes harder in a
wireless sensor networking scenario, especially in harsh environments, due to the potential
avenues for spoofing and physical attacks. Reliance on centralized algorithms to identify
these integrity threats is impractical given the scale and dynamism of the environment.
We explore conditions or threat vectors under which a wireless network of devices may
become unreliable in a fully distributed setting, and present an approach to identify potential
integrity failures or threats using a collaborative approach that makes use of spatial and
temporal locality to understand context [2]. We present the effectiveness of our approach
through a use–case analysis for precision agriculture applications. Through experimental
3and trace–based simulations, we show that threats can potentially be identified in real–time
with 80% accuracy and at about 90% precision and recall.
1.3 Collaborative Privacy Intelligence
The IoT devices have become the eyes and ears of the physical environment. Rich user
interactions and powerful sensors at the Edge mean they have access to an unprecedented
amount of data, in some cases, private in nature. Models learned on such data hold the
promise of greatly improving usability by powering more intelligent applications instead of
learning on purely consolidated data. There may be risks and responsibilities to storing it
in a centralized location when the data is private. Given the abundance of data from a
large pool of devices with possible privacy constraints, collaborative learning drives scalable
intelligence.
With Collaborative Privacy Intelligence, we aim to understand privacy invasion by re-
verse engineering an individual’s posture using derived insights from the sensors’ data, and
quantify the level of intrusion based on a generated ruleset for Localization and Emotional
dimensions of privacy [3]. By having sensors track activities in these dimensions, like sitting
and working at a desk, or being Optimistic(happy and surprise), and learning rule books
from the collective insights, we are able to predict ones privacy attributes, an individual’s
activities and state, with reasonable accuracy.
4PART 2
COLLABORATIVE EDGE COMPUTING: OPPORTUNISTIC MOBILE IOT
WITH BLOCKCHAIN BASED COLLABORATION
The pervasiveness of the Internet–of–Things (IoT) is leading the way to a world of
smart systems, applications and services powered by mobile devices. Cloud based mobile
IoT is paving the way for a large number of emerging applications and computing platforms.
One of the key challenges in realizing mobile IoT systems using current day cloud solutions
is the heavy dependence on centralized cloud infrastructures. Such centralized solutions
are necessary to address the large scale of IoT, however, the performance of such systems
degrade with the wireless network connectivity between the device and the cloud. Also,
with the growing need for data creation, access and storage, the network backbones will
be inundated with data if they try to handle every IoT application and service request
using centralized data centers. This dependency on centralized architecture can lead to
performance degradation and eventually unreliability in mobile IoT systems.
Even as we move towards Edge Computing for IoT workloads to counter computational
inefficiencies and network limits with cloud based architectures, the fact that mobile IoT
machines are getting smarter and more powerful is encouraging. IoT devices are getting
packed with resources such as sensors, computing, I/O, etc. However, these resources are
being completely underutilized as most of them are used only for a certain duration for
specific applications. For instance, a smartphone with quad–core processors has more com-
puting power and storage than necessary for an average daily usage which mostly involves
access to text and emails; a smart printer in an office is largely in sleep and usually handles
jobs in aperiodic chunks; a smart TV is used more in the evenings at homes. The scenario
applies to services available on devices as well. For instance, printer services and camera
video capabilities are unused for a large percentage of the time. In essence, there is excess
5Figure (2.1) Opportunistic Collaborative IoT using Blockchains
resource and service capacity available in mobile IoT devices at the Edge opening up a huge
opportunity for sharing them across all available nodes, in a paradigm that we would term
as the Collaborative Edge. In this regard, we propose a system design for better utilization
of resources and services in mobile IoT through opportunistic collaboration at the Edge.
2.1 Towards opportunistic collaboration
As we look to address the above issues with network reliability, and resource and service
underutilization, we realize the need for opportunistic collaboration of IoT devices to share
resources and services when they are available. Opportunistic collaboration becomes neces-
sary as application offloading to the cloud may not always be possible due to bandwidth and
latency concerns. Also, the problem gets worse at scale. We seek to improve computational
and network usage efficiency by mechanizing efficient ways to drive decisions and insights to
6execute applications and services closer to the devices, at the edge. Improving computation
efficiency through collaboration coupled with the opportunistic usage of unused capacity
in devices and at the edge, motivates our proposed opportunistic collaborative mobile IoT
design. The proposed solution uses the well–known paradigm of blockchains to facilitate the
collaboration, as illustrated in Figure. 2.1.
2.1.1 Blockchain based collaboration
We present a novel collaborative mobile IoT architecture that lets mobile IoT devices
come together in an adhoc manner, advertise their excess resource capacity and offered
services using the blockchain framework. The collaborating devices are connected through a
blockchain network that manages data dissemination in the network. The system uses smart
contracts to advertise excess resources and network capacity, which are synchronized across
a global network of blockchain nodes. These contracts are binding in nature and transparent
to the network of nodes participating in the blockchain. Resources are made available to
the seeking devices through containers (e.g. docker) so that applications can be executed
in a sandboxed fashion and do not need rooting the device. Services are made available
through peer–to–peer (P2P) communication protocols. Here, services can be those initiated
by apps or broad IT infrastructure based services that cater to diverse applications and other
dependent services.
This approach lays the foundation for a distributed computing solution for mobile IoT
that lets one opportunistically use excess capacity on resources and services. In essence, our
proposal is a distributed middleware design that leverages blockchain technology for smart
resource/service discovery, coordination and management.
In summary, the key contributions of this solution are:
(i) Design of a distributed mechanism to allocate resources and execute services through
smart blockchain contracts and application execution on sandboxed containers,
(ii) Implementation of a prototype collaborative mobile IoT system on Raspberry Pis
and a Dell IoT edge gateway, and
7(iii) Evaluation of network latency and benchmarking resource utilization under col-
laboration.
2.1.2 Related Work
We discuss related works from the areas of resource abstraction platforms, resource
lookup algorithms, distributed resource sharing platform and service invocation platforms.
Ardalan Amiri Sani et. al. [4], proposed an architecture RIO, for the abstraction of
resources using a separation of the application layer from the operating systems services
and kernel layer. Their approach addresses the specific area of resource abstraction with
cross memory mapping. Daniel J. Dubois et. al. [5], proposed a middleware ShAir, for
P2P resource sharing. It elaborates on the abstraction of resources using an event bus.
While the approach addresses resource abstraction, it does not address specifically the adhoc
networking and resource registry aspects. Ion Stoica et al. [6] discuss the approach of P2P
lookup of Internet applications. It uses a distributed lookup protocol that helps map a given
key to a node with the right content and efficiently handles the dynamic registration and
exits of the nodes in the network. Salem, et.al, [7] have proposed a mechanism for sharing
resources at the edge. It uses registries and a central mediation to choose the right resources
based on demand. Also, they introduce the concept of compensation for the resources used.
IBM and Samsung [8] have brought together in a proof of concept, the blockchain as
a repository of assets, their artifacts and related services, along with the P2P fabric using
Telehash that enables discovery and communication. This is testament to the fact that
decentralized IoT is permeating the industry and there is a perceived need for it in the
near term. One of the key aspects to fully realize it is the flexibility to execute any apps or
services on any device using any resource in the pool. SingularityNet [9] has brought together
multiple AI services talking to each other to drive synergies from a decentralized AI. The
underlying platform to support this level of communication is a decentralized system on
blockchain that support services and apps. The group led by Prof. Bhaskar Krishnamachari
in USC [10] explores block chain technology for diverse areas. These are clear evidences that
8the decentralized platform to advertise, discover and instantiate services and apps using
blockchains is key to materializing highly sophisticated concepts in diverse areas.
Our proposed architecture helps provide a one–stop solution to: (a) Sharing of system
resources and services, (b) Decentralized mediator and decision making, and (c) Compensa-
tion for sharing. While such features have been discussed in many technologies and research
works before, combining all into a single entity framework has not been well explored.
2.2 Opportunistic Collaborative Platform design
2.2.1 Blockchain Overview
Blockchain is a distributed database for an active list of records called blocks. Each
block contains a timestamp and a link to a previous block making blockchain a chronological
sequence of blocks with all transactions recorded up to that point in time. Just as transac-
tions execute, they are mined, validated and added to blocks to be synchronized with the rest
of the blockchain network. A blockchain serves as an open, transparent distributed ledger
that can record transactions between parties efficiently and in a verifiable and permanent
way. The ledger hosts transactions and smart contracts that can be triggered and executed
automatically in software. A smart contract is a computerized transaction protocol that
executes the terms of a contract. All of its code and data are housed in the blockchain and
synchronized across the network.
2.2.2 System Overview
The core of this design is a distributed middleware that enables collaboration of mobile
IoT elements using the capabilities of blockchain network. The blockchain framework helps
to advertise, disseminate and make resources and services available to the network of IoT
devices. Our design focuses on a localized blockchain network of nodes. We position that
each network of IoT devices can form a small blockchain network that can expand organically
as more devices are registered into this collaborative network. It also provides a virtual
gateway to other blockchain networks making information on resource and service available
9on a global scale.
As shown in Figure. 2.1, there are two key elements that comprise this distributed
architecture: (a) applications and services that require resources, (b) distributed collection
of IoT elements (devices and machines) with resources to share. Here, the IoT elements
are termed as the collaborating nodes. Discovery of services and resources (computing and
storage), consent for collaboration, invocation of services and allocation of resources are done
using smart contracts that are deployed by each of the collaborating nodes in the blockchain.
These contracts contain information of the list of available services and resources on each
node. Through the blockchain framework these contracts are shared among all the nodes in
the network.
A subset of the blockchain nodes, designated (through consensus) as miners, create
and update smart contracts across the blockchain. For example, in an office room scenario
of a collaboration network of a phone, printer, laptop, smart voice assistant and smart
thermostat, the device with the highest computing power can be designated as the first
miner. In essence, every device in the network can be designated as the miner. The downside
is that the information dissemination time would increase as synchronization of each contract
update will have to percolate through each miner node and arrive at a consensus. Depending
on the number of miners the convergence can take few seconds to minutes. On the other
hand, less number of miners will put a heavy load on a few miners. This lends itself to an
interesting trade off between miner count and resource availability.
2.2.3 System Workflow
The blockchain setup is a one–time process that involves all the mining and collaborating
nodes. Here, we particularly focus on the collaborative execution process and not on the
setup process. The setup process is analogous to setting up any IT infrastructure where
registration of devices and information routing is checked through template test benches. In
the office room example discussed above, the setup process is equivalent to registering the
devices in the network of blockchain and designating the potential miners. In this section,
10
Figure (2.2) System Workflow. Lines in Red are the contributions of this approach
we discuss the design details of the execution workflow of the process that happens once
a blockchain is setup and that a resource requirement is found in the network. How the
network of nodes collaborate among themselves in a distributed manner to help each other
achieve their tasks (applications and/or services) is the key notion of this workflow design.
We discuss this workflow in more detail using the illustration in Figure. 2.2. Note that
this framework does not implement any new security measures, but inherits the security
guarantees provided by the Blockchain and the underlying wired/wireless network.
(Step 1) Service and Resource Registration. Any node with resources or services to
offer registers the resources and/or services with the smart contract deployed in its blockchain
network. The contracts contain resources and services available for rent/lease along with
their cost and node identity in an encrypted manner. When the resources are advertised,
they are recorded along with the identity of the node offering the same. This minimizes the
resource discovery time as it accounts for locality in addition to keeping fragmentation to
a minimum. Once a resource or service becomes available, it goes through a dissemination
cycle, beginning with the blockchain contract getting invoked. As this request changes the
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state of the transaction, it gets synchronized with the rest of the blockchain that involves
mining of the transaction, creation of a block and subsequently synchronization with the rest
of the blockchain cluster. As the technologies move closer to autonomous operations, it is
extremely important for resources and services to be discovered when needed. Having them
on the blockchain makes them immediately available and easy to audit, two key aspects as
we look into distributed autonomous systems.
(Step 2 & 3) Application Profiling. Once an application is kicked off, a typical appli-
cation management system profiles the apps for its required and excess resources. It also
acquires the list of services that might be invoked as part of the execution cycle of the apps
and some of these services might be spread across the network. The apps and services to
profile are invoked through an automated triggering process during the contract preparation.
(Step 4) Resource Allocation. Once distributed or queued for execution, the edge com-
puting units check for the availability of the resources and/or services necessary to execute
the apps and services. These edge units can be a single edge computer or a collection of
nodes in the blockchain at the edge of the network. If the edge units do not have sufficient
computing resources as requested in the contracts the request is turned to the blockchain
nodes to execute the apps and services. Selection of the blockchain nodes to execute the
apps and services comprises the resource allocation phase. Any traditional resource alloca-
tion mechanism that optimizes for latency based on available computing resources works in
this case. However, the adhoc and distributed behavior of the blockchain approach simplify
the resource allocation process to a simple resource matching process by comparing con-
tracts. This is possible because the contracts are agreed upon based on consensus and all
collaborating nodes are informed of every other node’s resource requirement and availability.
This execution is analogous to pairing and agreement among the collaborating IoT devices
in the office scenario to help each other with resources to execute the apps pertinent in the
network. In the event, the nodes in the network do not have excess resources exposed for use,
the nodes initiating the apps will fall back to the central edge or cloud computing framework.
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(Step 5 & 6) Execution and Compensation. Once the node with the available resources
is acquired the app is executed and the results gathered. App/service execution is done in
sandboxed containers that get deployed in the blockchain nodes during the execution process.
As we will describe later, our prototype system uses docker [11] containers, however, any type
of sandboxing solution will work. In addition to satisfying the service and resource demands,
it matches the rental price with the price the requesting entity is ready to pay for the resource
or the service. Once either one is granted to the requesting entity, the node renting them is
compensated for it with cryptocurrency (e.g. bitcoin [12], ethereum [13]).
Note the distinction between ‘initiation’and ‘invocation’; initiation of the app/service
involves Resource discovery while invocations refer to execution which is instantaneous. For
instance, deploying an HTTP service (initiation) versus accessing webpage using HTTP urls
(invocation). Service invocation takes on a lot more importance in solutions that tie them
together by cascading them and getting results to be fed as inputs to the next set of services.
SingularityNet [9] has set an example of cascading the artificial intelligence services so they
no longer as just speech or text AI services, but services that work in tandem to create a
coherent solution. Such examples make a compelling case for the need of our decentralized
collaborative platform.
2.3 Platform Efficiency
We conducted experiments using a prototype implementation of our proposed system
to evaluate the feasibility and benefits of the collaborative approach. We use latency and
resource utilization efficiency as the metrics for our evaluation, where
• App Execution Latency is defined as the time it takes for all steps in the workflow in-
cluding the latency for resource procurement, transfer and deployment, and initiation.
This is equivalent to user response time or service delivery time.
• Resource Utilization Efficiency is defined as a combination of the dissemination ef-
ficiency to draw up a binding contract that makes the resource available on the
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blockchain network and the procurement efficiency to allocate resources to the re-
questing entity.
2.3.1 Experiment setup and methodology
We set up a blockchain network with 4 nodes forming a private network which are set to
mine transactions and blocks, each on a single thread. The setup comprises 3 Raspberry Pi3
and a Dell 5100 IoT gateway, all of which have resources to spare (x RAM, y CPU cycles,
z storage) and services available that are advertised on the blockchain as part of a contract
with appropriate usage costs. Any app that wants to use these resources and/or services will
need to request and acquire a handle to them and compensate the offering node. The nodes
each have (pseudo) accounts set up to receive compensation for mining, resources leased and
services invoked through pseudo cryptocurrency. Table 2.1 outlines the configuration of the
Raspberry Pis and the Dell gateway. Four containerized apps on Docker [11] with different
data and storage requirements and execution priorities are used as sandboxes for executing
the apps and services. All experiments were conducted in an office room environment with
the 3 Raspberry Pi nodes and the Dell edge gateway placed in the same local area network
within 5m radius.
Nodes RAM(GB) Storage(GB) CPU
Raspberry Pis 1GB LPDDR2 32GB microSD 4x ARM 1.2GHz
Dell5100 GW 2GB DDR3L-1067MHz 32GB SSD Intel E3825 1.33GHz
Table (2.1) HW Configuration of IoT Nodes
We deploy 4 containerized apps using our architecture and they are set to be available as
services in our prototype system. A Java program that simulates App Manager and Profiler
invokes the blockchain contract to procure resources to invoke services. This setup helps
evaluate the effects of sharing resources and services on the network. The containerized apps
we use for our evaluation are:
• whoami: greets the invoking user: size: 2.1 MB
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• busybox httpd: a full-fledged web server: size: 3.1 MB
• mysqld: a mysql database: size: 190MB
• dockerui: UI for docker management: size: 4.5 MB
2.3.2 App Execution latency
Figure (2.3) App Execution Latency
We consider 3 aspects when evaluating app execution latency: (a) Resource procure-
ment, (b) App deployment, and (c) App invocation. We will compare these steps for our
proposed Collaborative approach, purely computing on Edge and joint edge and collaborative
when the system will Fallback to Edge when the resources are not available in the collabo-
rating nodes. Here, edge implies a monolithic powerful edge with compute capabilities closer
to the source of data, and our solution implies an “Elastic Edge” with multiple nodes col-
laborating. The Edge is not opportunistic and all resources necessary for the execution of
apps and services have to be provisioned at the Edge when the app/service is initiated.
We observe from Figure. 2.3 that our collaborative system’s execution latency is compa-
rable to that of a purely centralized Edge computing system. This shows that a collaborative
distributive approach to mobile IoT is feasible. We also note that the collaboration may not
necessarily provide all resources requested, in which case the system is able to fallback to the
edge. We can observe that the fallback to edge approach has a minimal overhead as resource
discovery time is very small in the blockchain based architecture due to the information
availability on all nodes through smart contracts.
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Note that in our setup the Edge was placed in the same local network within a 5m radius
of the collaborating nodes. The latency for app setup phase will scale with the distance
between the requesting nodes and the edge unit. In a separate benchmark experiment, we
observed a network latency (cellular) of the order of 50ms for an Edge computing device
placed 10 miles away from the experiment office location. In the collaborative approach, the
apps are present and available on the local network. It is important to note that once the
resource is procured for a service app, it is available instantaneously for all other user apps
that access the service.
The app execution latency tAE is the cumulative sum of the resource procurement time
tRP , app deployment time tAD and app initiation time tAI . The app deployment time is a
function of transmission rate and app size and the app initiation time is transmission latency
coupled with message processing time to procure a resource handle. The procurement time
is the same as the time it takes for the replicas to reach consensus on when a resource has
been released for use or reacquired into the pool. The slope is dependent on a few factors;
proportional to the queuing delay at each replica in a bigger network (>4 replicas) and
inversely proportional to the transmission delay (increased transmission delay offsets the
queuing delay at each replica).
The 3 latency measures can be expressed as,
tRP = (slope ∗ nreplicas) + b; slope = a ∗ tqueue
ttrans
(2.1)
where, a and b are empirically measured constants that account for network factors that
impact performance and compute capacity of nodes in a heterogeneous network, respectively.
tAD =
sizeapp
ratetrans
; tAI = ttrans + tmsgprocess (2.2)
2.3.3 Resource Utilization Efficiency
In contrast to our proposed collaborative approach, a purely edge computing environ-
ment does not take advantage of the device resource pool. Table 2.2 shows the baseline
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resource usage of the 4 nodes in our network, and Table 2.3 shows the resource usage after
deploying the apps using our collaborative model. We can observe from the usage statistics
that collaborative approach enables to allocate resources through a proper matching of avail-
able with requested. In our test case, we ensured that the resources required for the 4 apps
are available in the collaborating nodes. In reality, the system will have to fall back to the
edge or cloud in case the resource is not available. However, the collaboration presents a first
hand opportunity to run the applications and services merely through mutual agreements
and only approach the central edge/cloud units when no agreements can be reached. Due to
the distributive nature of blockchains, such a case is rare as finding at least one node that
has the available resource has a non-trivial probability.
Node RAM Storage CPU
RP1 0.381 (38%) 5.922/29 (20%) 2%
RP2 0.329 (33%) 7.271/29 (25%) 2%
RP3 0.421 (42%) 8.372/29 (29%) 2%
Dell 0.597 (30%) 11.383/25 (46%) 3%
Table (2.2) Resource Usage before deploying apps – percentage of total capacity of the node
Node (App) RAM Storage CPU
RP1 (whoami) 0.395 (40%) 5.938/29 (20%) 2%
RP2 (httpd) 0.471 (47%) 7.422/29 (26%) 4%
RP3(dockerui) 0.489 (49%) 8.391/29 (29%) 3%
Dell(mysqld) 0.723 (36%) 12.123/25 (48%) 9%
Table (2.3) Resource Usage after deploying apps– percentage of total capacity of the node
To understand the resource utilization better we discuss a use–case to highlight the
benefit of the collaborative approach: A gaming app needs resources from multiple nodes as a
single node does not have the required resources. The request has to be supported by multiple
nodes with partial resources. Suppose the request is for 200 MB of memory, a camera and a
microphone, it is possible to fulfill the request from multiple nodes by allocating 50 MB from 4
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different nodes and camera and microphone from individual nodes. However, the caveat here
is that the app must be able to accept resources from multiple sources. E.g. an application
that requires camera and microphone at the same location may not benefit, however, it
can resolve to find a node that offers the RAM while using the camera and mic from a
different node. Our framework supports such a management of resources. Our distributed
model allows for handling heterogeneous set of resources from physically separated entities,
which gets complicated using traditional central resource allocation techniques. This is made
possible through the use of blockchain.
2.4 Takeaways and Future work
In this chapter, we explored the idea of an opportunistic collaborative resource sharing
for mobile IoT systems. We designed a novel architecture that uses blockchains for col-
laboration and developed a mechanism that opportunistically identifies available resources,
advertised services and invoked or utilizes them based on a collaborative consensus. We
implemented a preliminary prototype of a 4node collaborative IoT network along with an
edge computing gateway. Through experimental evaluation, we showed the feasibility of the
collaborative architecture with overall app execution latency comparable to the traditional
centralized edge approach and a much better resource utilization.
This model can be used further to explore larger scale collaborative blockchain networks
as outlined in our work on 5G IoT in a book chapter [14]. Although a detailed empirical
study of scale is out of scope of this chapter, here’s how a scaled collaborative edge-computing
5G mobile IoT platform is expected to evolve. The Edge, in addition to collaboration with
localized nodes outlined here, will interact with Fog or Core nodes. These Core nodes
are analogous to small data centers and have the necessary compute, storage and network
capabilities to run substantial workloads. These Core nodes will also take advantage of
architectural advances made with 5G, like NFV, Network Slicing and SDDC. To complete
the end-to-end flow, these core nodes will connect back to the Cloud for any central updates,
giving this structure centralized and decentralized control. Blockchains, used for application
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and service coordination will evolve into a more sophisticated architecture with localized
structural boundaries with more frequent synchronization that fits into a more globally
distributed structure. On these blockchain nodes, although resource/service procurement
times on a small network with little transmission delays are found to vary linearly with the
number of nodes, queueing delays play a huge role in bigger networks driving consensus
times higher making it important to profile and optimize the blockchain network for the
workloads we are interested in. Although empirical evidence from this chapter shows an
ideal fit in localized networks like office buildings, store locations, or industrial floors, this
scaled architecture over 5G with Edge Computing and Blockchain based collaboration would
be ideal for any complex IoT workloads.
Figure (2.4) Collaborative Edge Scaling
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PART 3
COLLABORATIVE EDGE SECURITY: INTEGRITY THREAT
IDENTIFICATION FOR DISTRIBUTED IOT IN PRECISION
AGRICULTURE
Despite lack of trust, the show must go on! The IoT Value/Trust Paradox survey
in 2017, [15] of 3,000 consumers found that 53 percent of respondents believed that Internet–
of–Things (IoT) devices make their life easier, but only 9 percent have a high level of trust
that their data collected and shared via IoT is secure. Despite the low levels of trust, 42
percent of respondents report they were not willing to disconnect their IoT devices, even
temporarily, because they bring sufficient value to them. These numbers attest to the fact
that IoT devices have become so integrated into human lives that it is almost impossible
to imagine disconnecting from the world of IoT – meaning that trust, or lack of it, hardly
seems to impact IoT adoption.
With consumers finding it increasingly difficult to disconnect, the only practical way to
support adoption of IoT is with stronger security policies and by being transparent about
data being used. To do so, one of the key factors for understanding is the potential for
failures or precisely, the threat vectors. Two key areas for threat vectors figure prominently
in IoT deployments: (i) ones that arise from device malfunctioning, (ii) ones that arise from
(malicious) user–driven attacks or control changes. It is the ignorance or opaqueness in our
current IoT system designs to such fundamental threats that brings about the question of
validity of the data being sampled on each of the devices in the IoT network. An exhaustive
list with reasoning on why devices become untrustworthy over time has been outlined in
[16].
Data trustworthiness in precision agriculture: To get an exemplar sense of the funda-
mental issues in lack of data trust validation, we consider the application of IoT in precision
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Figure (3.1) Precision Agriculture Data Integrity
agriculture. The US Department of Homeland Security outlines three broad categories of
threat vectors [17] for precision agriculture:
(a) Threats to Confidentiality: This attributes to the concern in loss of data privacy
of the farmers and potential reputation loss for the collaborating hardware and software
manufacturing companies.
(b) Threats to Integrity: This attributes to the concern in potential falsification of data
and introduction of rogue data into the devices/network, including sensor failures in harsh
conditions (watering/flood, tractor weight, high/low temperatures).
(c) Threats to Availability: This attributes to the concern in potential unavailability of
equipment and other cyber–related outages including natural disasters. This is key because
farming and livestock operations largely depend on specific equipment and tools.
3.1 Towards Collaborative Security
To this end, in this paper, we focus on addressing the Threats to Integrity problem. In
particular, we set up the problem as finding techniques to identify potential threats to sensor
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data in a distributed set of wireless networked sensors. The threat identification in prior
research have primarily focused on identifying unidentified or authenticated nodes or devices
on the network or profiling them based on characteristics that are either static or predictable.
Once identified and authenticated in one of the numerous ways, nodes are entirely trusted
and values from them are acted upon and propagated. However, it is entirely possible for
any malicious player with physical access to or in physical proximity to the network to
tamper with either the device or the conditions, making it essential to identify these data
integrity issues among a set of authenticated sensor nodes. As outlined by the DHS [17],
threats to Integrity are real, have a huge financial impact and remain unresolved at this
point. We explore and evaluate this in the context of Precision agriculture that employs a
distributed mesh sensor network due to the extensive real estate that needs to be monitored
and maintained at a reasonable cost. The sensors on the network are often connected via
cellular, Bluetooth, or Wi-Fi networks and rely on edge computing to make decisions at
the source. The solution entails the use of spatial and temporal locality of sensors on the
distributed network to detect data integrity threats as shown in Figure. 3.1.
To solve the threat identification problem we design a new spatio–temporal aware in-
tegrity algorithm that detects potential threats in a set of sampled data and quantifying
through a threat score metric. The core idea of this algorithm is based on using the Local
Outlier Factor (LOF) technique to identify outliers in a dataset through a clustering mech-
anism. The uniqueness of our approach is to involve the spatial and temporal distribution
of the sensor values in a unified manner for threat considerations. In this approach, sen-
sors within a local window (finite geographic range and sampling time window) are set for
threat investigations periodically, and this activity is duplicated across all the sensors in the
deployment. This means that the threat identification algorithm will run on each sensor
device and will work with data points from neighbor sensors within spatial vicinity. We
design our system using the analogy of a mesh network topology in a farm setting, and setup
experiments and simulations in such a setting to evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed
design.
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3.1.1 Related Work
It is noteworthy that our problem in question is fundamentally different from traditional
network security issues which have a long history of solutions through cryptography. Security
checks for devices have long been done through attestation methods that conduct a check
on the identity of the device. This is the closest form of integrity threat check that relates
to validating the integrity or trust of actual data from the device.
Hardware based or binary attestation is based on binaries that have been executed on
the execution platform. TPM [18] is a co-processor designed to protect cryptographic keys
and record software state of a computing platform by using a set of special-purpose Platform
Configuration Registers (PCRs). Each PCR stores a single cryptographic hash which can
be read by external software. The concept of a Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement
(DRTM) [19] was introduced to address the issue of static PCR read sequence, by allowing the
chain of measurements to begin at a user-defined point in the platforms operation. Software
Guard Extensions (SGX) [20] provide a hardware-enforced isolated execution environment
(an enclave) for application software. The enclave provides a means of attesting software
inside the enclave to other enclaves. Binary attestation is brittle as any configuration changes
or upgrades result in different hashes of binaries, even if the platform remains in a trustworthy
state, leading to high false positives in flagging threats in a wireless sensor network.
Software based attestation verifies integrity of resource-constrained embedded devices
which have no hardware security features to store secrets for attestation. It exploits side–
channel information, such as precise time needed by the prover to perform specific compu-
tation. Limitations include strong assumptions about adversarial capabilities, and this only
works if the verifying entity communicates directly with the proving device, with no interme-
diate hops. However, multihop paths are unavoidable to ensure end–end threat identification
over a distributed wireless sensor network.
Hybrid attestation While binary (hardware) attestations are impractical in most
situations without a strong hardware support, software attestations have certain constraints
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to work with. Below are some hybrid approaches that address challenges with binary and
software attestations.
(a) Minimal Trust Anchors: The SMART architecture [21] provides a dynamic root of
trust for low-end devices without specialized memory management or protection features.
(b) TrustLite [22] is a generic security architecture for low-end embedded systems. It
allows OS-independent isolation of specific software modules, called trustlets. TrustLite
introduces the Execution-Aware Memory Protection Unit (EA-MPU) as a generalization of
simple means of memory protection, such as SMART.
(c) Physical Utility Functions (PUF): A PUF[23] based system that maps a set of
challenges to a set of responses based on the underlying physical micro structure of the device.
PUFs are equivalent to a fingerprint for the hardware element in the device, potentially
identifying the device through specific measures. It has been shown that radio signals’ RSS
(received signal strength) [24] can be used to identify a transmitting party. PUF and wireless
link fingerprints ensure that the data is coming from the stated IoT device and from the
stated location [25]. However, the key challenges of PUFs are that they hard to implement
and are very technology specific..
(d) Based on Sensor and Process Noise: A combined fingerprint for sensor and process
noise is created during the normal operation of the system as outlined in Noiseprint [26].
Under sensor spoofing attack, noise pattern deviates from the fingerprinted pattern. To
extract the noise difference between expected and observed value, a representative model
of the system is derived and the Kalman filter is used for state estimation. This method
performs device identification and profiling of normal operating range for comparison against
compromised profiles. However, it requires pre–calibration of each sensor setup to obtain
fingerprints for filter modeling, which can be unrealistic in a farm or large scale settings.
(e) Based on PUF data signing: Trusted sensors, as outlined in [23], offer integrity,
authenticity and non–repudiation guarantees on the sensed data by leveraging PUFs as root
of trust. This is done by having the sensor firmware sign the data, and integrity of the
firmware is achieved by secure boot of the sensor. This PUF-based design maps onto a
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typical low-end sensor hardware and does not require any hardware modifications. Although
applicable to standalone sensors, it is complex and cost prohibitive.
Although all of the above hybrid mechanisms help with authentication at a cost, they
fall short of validating the data and identifying any kind of anomalies in data from distributed
network of devices.
3.1.2 Background on Mesh Network
Before we discuss the proposed threat identification system architecture, we briefly
review the traditional knowledge of mesh network design. This is to ensure consistency in
the understanding of the type of network topology we chose for our design explanation and
evaluation.
Our proposed mechanism depends on the network establishment and routing details of
the Open Thread protocol [27] for mesh networks. Although we use the Thread network for
our evaluation, the framework is generic to any distributed network. The below device types
are included in a Thread network:
– Border Routers provide connectivity from the 802.15.4 network to adjacent networks
on other physical layers (Wi-Fi, Ethernet, etc.). These routers have special characteristics
like multiple interfaces. There may be one or more of these on the network.
– Thread Routers provide routing services to network devices. Thread Routers provide
joining and security services for devices trying to join the network. The Routing Enabled
End Devices (REED) can become Thread Routers, but not Border Routers.
– A Leader manages membership to the network and roles of the nodes. It maintains a
registry of assigned router IDs and accepts requests from router-eligible end devices (REEDs)
to become routers. The Leader, like all routers in a Thread network, can also have device-
end children. All information contained in the Leader is present in other Thread Routers so
that if the Leader fails or loses connectivity with the network, another Router is elected to
be a Leader.
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– End devices that are not router-eligible can be either FEDs (full end devices) or MEDs
(minimal end devices).
The Thread Mesh Link Establishment (MLE) [28] protocol establishes a network, con-
figures links and disseminates information about the network. Also, It is used to discover and
establish links to neighboring devices, determine their quality, and negotiate link parameters
with peers.
3.2 Spatio-Temporal locality based Threat detection
Figure (3.2) Our proposed integrity threat identification framework
We define a mechanism to detect threats using cluster based outlier detection techniques
and spatio–temporal locality based parameters. The scope of our contribution in this design
is that our technique opens up a new way to use existing knowledge on outlier detection in
an entirely distributed paradigm with locality based parameters. The technique identifies
physical layer data integrity threats related to sensor value tampering or falsification. Our
mechanism here involves distributed detection using data from neighboring nodes to form
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similar clusters and identify potential threats.
A fully distributed IoT network deployment in precision agriculture would use a mesh
network. As we set out to detect any outliers in the data flowing through this network as
outlined in the high level architecture in Figure. 3.2, we will leverage key characteristics of
a distributed network deployed in a wide farming area. In a wide area sensor deployment,
it is very practical to have sensors in certain patches report values that are similar or values
in the same range, or values trending similarly. This is true even with livestock reporting
temperature or humidity or other health related values. The key assumptions for the success
of this mechanism are that the network is fully distributed without any single point of failure
and there exist spatial and temporal locality in the network.
3.2.1 Local Outlier Factor Algorithm
We use the Local Outlier Factor (LOF) technique [29] to detect outliers in a data set with
varying distribution densities through a clustering approach. We develop on this algorithm
by extending this to a distributed paradigm with a locality based contextual variance and
introducing a histogram based approach for cluster delineation. The following paragraph
provides a brief discussion on the benefit of using LOF, with Figure. 3.3 describing the
pseudo–code of LOF algorithm. In the implementation, we use the lof function from the
DBScan package that is parameterized with the number of nearest neighbors that helps
control the clustering structure.
Consider the simple 2D data set shown in Figure. 3.4. There is a much larger number of
items in cluster C1 than in cluster C2, and the density of the cluster C2 is significantly higher
than the density of cluster C1. Our intent is to mark both objects p1 and p2 as outliers as
the conclusion is visually obvious. However, due to the low density of the cluster C1, it is
clear that for every item q inside the cluster C1, the distance between the item q and its
nearest neighbor is greater than the distance between the item p2 and the nearest neighbor
from the cluster C2. So, the item p2 will not be considered an outlier under a traditional
outlier detection algorithm that only looked at a global picture utilizing the nearest neighbor
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Figure (3.3) Local Outlier Factor (LOF) algorithm pseudocode
approach. Alternatively, LOF is able to capture both outliers (p1 and p2) due to the fact
that it considers the density around the points. The LOF algorithm runs with polynomial
time complexity and is mobile device-ready.
3.2.2 Spatio-Temporal locality based Threat detection algorithm
To this end, we assume that the network is setup and the device registration has already
been established. The core question we address is if the data values received from each sensor
are valid or not. To determine this, we run our proposed threat detection algorithm 1 on
each sensor node that collects data values from other neighboring nodes. We leverage the
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Figure (3.4) Results from Local Outlier Factor (LOF) algorithm
context of spatially local set of sensors, which is defined as a cluster of sensors within a finite
geographical area. This area is set based on the communication range of the sensors. In
addition, the data is sampled over a local time reference or window and the threat detection
is conducted periodically.
To understand the importance of spatio–temporal sampling in our work, let us take
the example of sensors deployed in an agricultural farm. In this case, the soil in the areas
of the farm within short distances are expected to have similar physical attributes such as
temperature, pressure, humidity, Oxygen content, Nitrogen content etc. We leverage this
fact to develop our insight that, the sensors within these relatively homogeneous spots in the
farm can communicate with one another and jointly agree/disagree on the values based on
comparative evaluation of the distribution of values they have sampled. This is analogous to
a group of people within a room being able to agree upon what the temperature of the room
could be or could not be (outlier) based on discussing with one another. The effect of outlier
and hence threat identification can be continued in this distributed fashion across multiple
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Figure (3.5) Sensor Network
cluster of nodes (or rooms as in the example mentioned above), thus enabling its impact at
scale. In this work, we describe the fundamental mechanics of the distributed technique and
aim to implement the functionality at large scale in future work.
In this regard, let us consider the mesh network configuration as shown in Figure. 3.5.
We use this network as the sensor spatial deployment reference. Here, each node (numbered
circles) represents the sensor device; the arrow represents the communication (connectivity).
The highlighted part of this network (6 nodes) is used in the evaluation of our technique
to be discussed in Section 3.3.1. We will now discuss each step of Spatio-Temporal Locality
based Threat Detection Algorithm[ 1] in detail.
Step 1: Data Maintenance for a time window: Each router–enabled node main-
tains values only of its neighbors. The neighbors are defined through a spatial adjacency
matrix based on the geographical distance; for instance, Node 4 will maintain values only for
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Algorithm 1 Spatio-Temporal Locality based Threat Detection
// Algorithm actively runs on all routing enabled nodes in real time
Data: Metric data from all adjacent nodes
Data: Mesh network and routing metadata
Data: Configured time interval for algorithmic runs
Result: Identified threats
while Router node is active do
while Looping for the threat detection time interval do
Data persistence: Persist data from all the adjacent nodes for the time interval
end
Create Contextual Mean and Variance: In the structure outlined in table 3.1
Run LOF algorithm: Using Mean and Variance as dimensions, as outlined in Figure. 3.3
Record Threat Scores: In the structure outlined in table 3.2
Calculate threat score threshold: Using a standard deviation based heuristic method
Identify Threats: Using the threshold that was calculated
Notification of Threats: Notify the elected leader of the mesh network
end
the nodes connected to it : {2, 3, 5, 7, 8 , 11}. Data from each node is sampled periodically
and communicated across to its cluster’s router-enabled node. If 1/Ts is the sampling rate
at each sensor node, the threat detection routine is executed every Td time window, where
Td > Ts. This time window is determined based on how long some characteristic would be
either constant or would be predictable. The time window duration is selected based on the
sampling duration on the nodes, ensuring that there are statistically relevant amount of non-
trivial (anything with non-zero information) data (atleast few hundred samples) collected in
each iteration.
Step 2: Create contextual Mean and Variance: The sensor values collected in
the relay node are recorded in a time-stamped table. Such a table is maintained for each
physical attribute, for e.g. temperature, humidity, oxygen levels, etc. We will refer to a
physical attribute as a class. For each class the mean and variance of the values collected
in time window Td are computed. It records the mean and variance values for each class as
mij and vij, respectively, where i is class index and j is node index. TABLE 3.1 shows an
example Mean-Variance table.
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Table (3.1) Mean-Variance table. This is an example table for 3 physical sensing attributes
(classes). A new column is appended for each new class. Each table represents the ensemble
mean in time window Td. Here, mean and variance of sensor data from each of 11 nodes are
collected within the time window.
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
0 0 0
m12, v12 m22, v22 m32, v32
m13, v13 m23, v23 m33, v33
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
m18, v18 m28, v28 m38, v38
0 0 0
0 0 0
m111, v111 m211, v211 m311, v311
Step 3: Execute LOF algorithm: We ensure that there are sufficient number of non-
trivial mean and variance values collected in the table. We believe a few hundred entries for a
class is reasonably good (LOF needs atleast 25 to make a reasonable cluster identification).
If the number is lower than 25 we wait on the next time-window iteration. If there are
consistently trivial values collected in the table then it is a clear indication that something
is wrong with the sensor(s) and/or the collection. We will refer to the non-trivial case for
further discussion. The populated mean and variance values in each column (class) are input
as a tuple to the LOF algorithm 3.3, which outputs an LOF value for each class-node pair as
lofij. The lof values are maintained in a table as shown in TABLE 3.2. LOF computation is
a simple algebraic computation and thus converges fast (order of ms). Thus, even for large
numbers of nodes and potentially large number of clusters, the runs are effectively in real
time, making it viable to have this running in the nodes and/or the network at all times.
Step 4: Record Threat Scores: We use the LOF values in the context of threat scores
that underline the potential integrity threat to the sensors sampled in the list. The values of
the LOF represent the variability in the sampled measures – in this case mean and variance.
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Table (3.2) LOF of values from Mean-Variance table in time-window Td. The row and column
definitions are same as the mean-variance table.
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
0 0 0
lof12 lof22 lof32
lof13 lof23 lof33
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
lof18 lof28 lof38
0 0 0
0 0 0
lof111 lof211 lof311
If the variability in the measures are high then it will lead to potential outliers. If the outliers
are clearly identified then it could potentially be flagging the threat on the corresponding
sensor. However, depending on the density of data (very few nodes in connection range)
then the table may not be rich, thus increasing the chances of potential false-positives and
false-negatives. The LOF value computation is a measure of variability and is independent
of the which sensor nodes are connected. This implies that such a mechanism will also work
for mobility scenarios, for example, sensors deployed on livestock. Here, the sensor nodes,
as they move, will connect to different set of sensor nodes and a router node. Ensuring that
connectivity is maintained across the area of mobility of the nodes (movement of livestock
over a farm) is sufficient for our approach to work in mobile scenarios.
Step 5: Calculate threat score threshold: We set the threshold for the LOFs
for each class, for threat identification equal to µ + ασ, where µ and σ are the mean and
standard-deviation of the LOFs. Here α is a variable representing the length of the tail of the
distribution of the LOFs. The rationale for this form of threshold is by invoking the central
limit theorem that attributes a normal (Gaussian) distribution to an i.i.d (independent and
identically distributed) set of random variables. We treat the LOF values as i.i.d random
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variables and fit to a normal distribution curve assuming a large number of LOF samples,
that would converge to the mean and variance of the LOFs (for each class) in the table.
A small value of α essentially means highly sensitive (many of the sensors are flagged as
potential threats) but less selective (less precision in identifying the threat(s)), and a larger
value can lead to higher selectivity but lower sensitivity. As we will discuss later, in our
evaluation we will consider α values of 0.75, 1, 2 and 3, and report the precision, recall and
accuracy values for these choices in our datasets from our experiments.
Step 6: Identify Threats: All values above the set threshold for LOF are flagged
and the corresponding sensors are noted for potential threats. Since the LOFs note the class
and sensor ID, the exact sensor node and physical attribute that could have been at risk
or attacked or failed (power disconnection) can be identified. Since these computations are
running every cycle of the time-window, the process essentially happens in real-time with a
practical latency of the order of Td. Hence, once a sensor node is at threat it can be flagged
by our system in the order of Td + Tp, where Tp is the processing time of the mechanism in
total.
Step 7: Notification of Threats: One of the metadata aspects maintained in the
router node is the elected (during deployment phase which is out of scope of this paper)
leader for that cluster of nodes (the router node could be the leader itself), which is dynamic
and might change as memberships change on the mesh network. As soon as the threats
are identified, it is made imperative that the router node notify the leader of all the threats
identified by this node. Once the leader receives lists of threats from all router enabled nodes,
it can take decisions on either observing them closely or quarantining them or invoking human
involvement.
3.3 Precision Agriculture based Threat Detection
There are various topologies for geographical placement of sensors in a precision agri-
culture application scenario. As shown in Figure. 3.6, we broadly identify 4 types of such
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Figure (3.6) Geometry of sensor placements in a precision agriculture setting (left) and
sample LOFs from simulated sensor data for the specific geometry (right)
deployments in irrigation based farming: (i) Striated, (ii) Striated Type 2, (iii) Matrix and
(iv) Livestock. To better understand the use of LOF based threat detection, we compute the
LOFs for each of these cases by simulating the sensor values (for one class) for 100 nodes.
We sample the sensor values as S ±R, where R is a random number and ranges from [0kS];
we chose k = 5 arbitrarily for example purpose. In all the results shown, the sensor value
clusters are captured visually with a blue oval and the value density is captured visually with
a red circle around the sensor; the bigger the red circle, the lower its density, which implies
the bigger the circle around a sensor, the farther away from the cluster it stands and hence
a potential outlier. In all the experiments, the kdistance is kept at 3, which implies that the
admission to a cluster is based on its proximity in terms of values, to at least 3 neighbors.
Striated Irrigation Treatment 1: This involves farming similar crops in striated lines
with possibly some gaps between those lines of crops. Given that all sensors are laid out in
a straight line, and adjacent lines have the same crop, all sensors values will likely reflect
similar conditions and we can expect a single cluster across a small geographical area. In
the simulation, sensor readings were tampered with on 2 sensors by changing the conditions
around them. They were both detected and shown in the diagram pointed to by arrows and
will need to be investigated.
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Striated Irrigation Treatment 2: This involves farming 2 or 3 crops in alternate
striations. So, crop A and crop B would alternate in crop lines across the farm. At a
minimum, we would expect to see as many or more similarity clusters as there are crops in
the striated model. As before, in this scenario, sensor readings were tampered on 2 sensors
by changing the conditions around them and you will see them both pointed to by arrows.
So, the technique clearly identifies real threats, and also identifies some false positives and
in some cases, potential threats that are flagged for further investigation. This is illustrated
with the 2 red circles with a larger radii inside the blue oval marking the cluster. While
these 2 nodes were not intentionally tampered with, they are potential threats in the data
set that need further investigation. With a well calibrated density threshold, the number of
false positives will be reduced drastically.
Concentric Irrigation: This involves crops laid out in concentric circular or rectan-
gular patterns to ensure that the nutrients in soil are not depleted from any one crop. If
the radii of circles are large enough, Cluster delineation with concentric irrigation is similar
to the Striated Treatment 2, with the expected number clusters the same or more than the
number of crops in those clusters.
Matrix Irrigation: This involves crops laid out in a matrix with each crop in one
cell of the matrix. While it is possible to have many crops cultivated across the farm, it is
more typical to have just a few in a specific pattern. The number of crops and conditions
around the farm determine the number of clusters and the results shown indicate outliers
fully delineated – as noted visually.
Livestock farming: This brings about the aspect of mobility where livestock with
different characteristics to track are roaming about in the farm and needs to account for a
higher variability and a dynamic connectivity. The number of similarity clusters would vary
drastically and the results shown indicate multiple outliers corresponding to sensors that
were tampered with.
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3.3.1 Evaluation of the platform
We evaluate our system for its ability to detect threats with high accuracy. We conduct
evaluations by analyzing data from two types of sources: (1) Data from a 6 node setup
in a lab sensor deployment, and (2) Using datasets from Thoreau [30] – a fully buried
Wireless Underground Sensor Network at the University of Chicago. In the former, we
intentionally tamper the temperature on a random set of temperature sensor nodes, and
track the performance of our system in detecting those attacks from sampled data. In the
latter, we analyze the the soil temperature datasets from Thoreau for potential threats and
investigate if a real threat may have happened to the sensor.
We measure the performance of our threat identification system through the precision,
recall and accuracy metrics, defined as,
• Precision = real−threats−detected
total−threats(+)false−positives
• Recall = real−threats−detected
real−threats−detected(+)threats−not−detected
• Accuracy = real−threats−detected
total−number−of−threats
The experimental setup in the laboratory involved 6 RaspberryPi 3 nodes, each inte-
grated with a temperature sensor (sampling in oF ). The sensors sample temperature at 10
samples/sec. The setup includes a 7th device which is a Dell IoT Edge gateway [31]. The IoT
gateway is set as the router node and also serves as a virtual sensor network deployment. We
setup the dell gateway to publish 44 simulated temperature values which would correspond
to the 44 virtual sensor nodes in the mesh network. In this network we treat that all the
50 devices (6 real+ 44 virtual) are in proximity to one another. All the nodes were set to
communicate with one another using WiFi and followed the connection topology depicted
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Figure (3.7) Integrity Threat Detection feasibility through LOFs for real sensor data from a
wireless mesh network.
in Figure. 3.5. We implemented our threat identification mechanism in this deployment and
set it to execute on the IoT gateway.
The threat identification was executed every 5min.The experiment consisted of manually
attacking a set of sensors in each 5min cycle for 100 cycles. The attack included manually
bringing a hot device like a candle or heating rod close to the temperature sensor on the
specific nodes. It was ensured that the attack in each cycle was made at the same time
on the selected sensors and there were atleast 2 sensors and a maximum of 6 sensors being
physically attacked in this way during the experiments.
Feasibility of Threat Detection: In Figure. 3.7, we plot the threat scores (LOF values)
for first 10 cycles, for all the 50 sensors. It seems that the two big spikes need immediate
action as they seem like outliers, the smaller spikes mean that they should be flagged for
further investigation. This feasibility test visually indicates that if there was one or many
attacks, it will show up in the threat score. A refined threshold can help improve the fidelity
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Figure (3.8) Number of threats detected compared to ground truth (blue line) at multiple
threshold levels.
of identification by the machine.
Levels of Threat Detection: We plot the comparison chart between the number of threats
detected and ground truth, for the 100 cycles, in Figure. 3.8. We set the µ+ ασ threshold
for x = 0.75, 1, 2, 3. At α = 0.75, it lists almost all threats, though not with 100% success.
At α = 3 it gets highly selective and tries to call out the threats that may matter the most.
We present the statistics of the threat detection performance for 100 cycles for the 50 nodes
in a tabular form in Figure. 3.9. We can observe that the accuracy is about 81% for α = 0.75
with about 90% precision and recall. This means that at α = 0.75 threshold for LOF, the
reliability of the system is atleast 80% with a high selectivity (precision) and sensitivity
(recall) to detect threats. As α increases, we can observe that the accuracy drops sharply,
which can be attributed to the loss of sensitivity. However, we observe that the selectivity
improves and is almost 100% at α = 3, which implies that the system is certain of detecting
threats, but which of the threats in time and which node will need further investigation.
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Figure (3.9) Threat detection performance for 100 cycle experiment for 50 nodes (6 nodes
physically attacked and 44 nodes virtually attacked by noise addition).
However, this sets up the stage for advanced intervention techniques if it were detected that
a system was at threat. It is important to note that such a threat monitoring system of
sensor values in real time for distributed IoT is largely missing.
Effectiveness of the Threat Detection Classification: In Figure. 3.10, we plot the threat
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve for the 100 iteration cycle to assess the
effectiveness of the integrity detection classification algorithm. It plots the True Positive
Rate (TPR) to the False Positive Rate (FPR). An ROC curve demonstrates the tradeoff
between sensitivity and specificity (any increase in sensitivity will be accompanied by a
decrease in specificity). The closer the curve follows the left-hand border and then the top
border of the ROC space, the better the classification while the closer it comes to the 45-
degree diagonal of the ROC space, the worse it is and the area under the curve is a measure of
classification accuracy. Given these criteria, the curve in Figure. 3.10 shows a very effective
integrity detection classification algorithm.
• TruePositiveRate(Sensitivity/Recall) = Truepositive
TruePositive(+)FalseNegative
• FalsePositiveRate(1− Specificity) = 1− FalsePositive
FalsePositive(+)TrueNegative
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Figure (3.10) Integrity Threat Detection Classification Effectiveness using ROC curve.
Threat Detection Classification using Machine Learning : To detect threats without
assessing performance at multiple thresholds, we conducted a supervised classification on
the 100 iteration LOF data with the Random Forest classifier. The results are shown in
Figure. 3.11.
3.3.2 Thoreau Dataset Analysis
We measure the effectiveness of our approach with an external dataset from the fully
buried Wireless Underground Sensor Network, Thoreau, from the University of Chicago [30].
The sensors are spread across the university area as shown in Figure. 3.14. For analysis, we
picked the soil temperature datasets from 4 days in 2017; 1 day from each season, to find out
if there was any kind of threat on these sensors with anyone physically manipulating them
or possibly conditions drastically changing around them. The setup corresponding to the
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Figure (3.11) Integrity Threat Detection Classification Performance with Machine Learning
datasets involves a sensor pool with upto 20 sensors. The sensors are sampled almost every
30min and the time window Td for our accumulation was set to 2.5 hrs (at least 5 samples
for ensemble mean and variance of temperature in a cycle). Each iteration of the execution
conducts for every 2.5hrs sampled data.
Feasibility of Threat Detection: Figure. 3.12 shows the threat scores for each of the runs
for all sensors in the dataset over each of the selected 4 days. The number of iterations
(cycles) per day varies due to the variation in the dataset sizes for these days. Using a
heuristic threshold check based on the largest spikes, clearly, on 10/1/2017, values from
sensors s5 and s7 need further investigation; on 4/1/2017, s5 appears to stand apart from
the rest and needs to be investigated; on 1/1/2017, s4 at 2:30 appears to have spiked in a
clear deviation from the rest and needs attention; while 7/1/2017 appears almost normal
with no apparent large spikes.
Levels of Threat Detection: For a deeper dive into one of the scenarios, s2, s3 s5 and
possibly s7 on 4/1/2017 at 9:30 PM to 11:59 PM displays suspicious behavior as shown in
Figure. 3.13 where the threat identification is shown when multiple levels of thresholds are
used to identify the threat. Looking at the 4/1/2017 graph in Figure. 3.12, it is apparent
that both the sensors s5 and s3 have been consistently showing deviant behavior. These
correspond to sensor 1C78D4 at the GrahamSchool and 1C78D8 at IdaNoyes as shown in
Figure. 3.14. From investigation of the sensor data in the datasets, these two sensors are
showing temperature values of around 5.5oF , way below the rest of the sensors that are in
the 7-8oF . By applying the same technique across the rest of the list of the sensors, it is
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Figure (3.12) Thoreau Data Set: Threats by Season
possible to flag and identify most threats in the network.
3.4 Takeaways and Future work
In this chapter, we explored the problem of detecting integrity threats from physical
attacks on sensor nodes, through a usecase exploration of precision agriculture scenarios.
To address the problem, we designed a novel framework that uses Local Outlier Factor for
outlier detection with locality based mean and variance used as dimensions, and described
its usage across typical precision agriculture sensor deployment topologies. We implemented
a preliminary prototype with a 6-node IoT network using RaspberryPis and used additional
simluated values for effective cluster and threat creation. Through experimental evaluation
of a 6 sensor node setup and trace based analysis of a subset of data from the real world
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Figure (3.13) Threats on 4/1/2017 from 9:30 PM to 11:59 PM
underground sensor deployment (Thoreau), we showed the effectiveness of the model in
detecting integrity threats with reasonable accuracy and efficiency suitable for real-time
deployment.
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Figure (3.14) Threats on 4/1/2017 from 9:30 PM to 11:59 PM at the UC Campus
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PART 4
COLLABORATIVE PRIVACY INTELLIGENCE: USER PRIVACY
INTRUSION MODELING USING MACHINE LEARNING OF SMART
HOME IOT SENSORS DATA
The proliferation of smart Internet of Things (IoT) devices in our homes provides a level
of convenience in our day-to-day activities but also raises key privacy concerns. There is an
implicit concern among users that these devices storing important confidential information
about the user (identity, credit-card details, family profile, house information) could someday
go rogue leading to a doomsday question for user privacy. The general concern that, as
technology gets smarter by the day, the level of privacy gets weaker, is already being reflected
among users’ opinions today. With the array of smart sensors, assistants and perhaps robots
invading the smart home consumer market, majority of users are already raising concerns on
the need for constant monitoring (audio, video, indirect sensing) of the users. In a couple of
recent patents [32], Google imagines devices that would get a lot more intrusive than what’s
already available out there. We believe that it is only a matter of time before current day
smart home technology deployments potentially hit the tipping point for privacy intrusion.
Despite rising concerns of privacy, the reason smart home IoT devices exist is due to
the usefulness of data from them. For example, health insurers could use data from the
kitchen as a proxy for eating habits, and adjust their rates accordingly while landlords
could use occupancy sensors to see who comes and goes, or watch for photo evidence of
pets and life-insurance companies could penalize smokers caught on camera. It has been
shown[33] that using raw data from sensors as context information, it is possible to infer
users emotions as well, possibly advancing intervention mechanism for depression. In our
research, acknowledging the fact that there is a thin line between usefulness and privacy
intrusion of smart home sensor data, we explore the fundamental question of, when do the
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inferences generated about the user from the sensor data cross the line to being intrusive to
the user.
4.1 Towards Collaborative Privacy Intelligence
We aim to explore the level of privacy intrusion that can result from smart home sens-
ing deployments, and improve on our privacy intrusion paper [3] in various areas. We
focus our attention towards privacy questions and not security, and assume that the smart
home systems under consideration already have the typical communication and data security
frameworks in place. We acknowledge that systemic security vulnerabilities do exist in any
system and that the privacy issues can be amplified by them. However, in this work, we
take a step-wise approach to understanding privacy intrusion with focus only on the raw
and contextual data from the smart home sensors and devices. For example, can the system
infer if the user is working or relaxing based on the audio signature of keyboard clicking
and the motion sensing of the desk chair movement. Similarly, can the system locate the
exact position of the user in the house based on the sounds/noise produced? Can the system
infer the user’s mood based on the audio tone (high/low) and by extracting sentiments from
the transcribed texts? Can the smart camera extract your social pattern from the people it
detects and recognizes on a daily basis?
In this work, we posit that it is possible to determine the level of privacy intrusion
based on learning of the sensors’ data over time. We perform a privacy intrusion study
that combines data from smart home sensors, duplicates a user’s privacy posture, and helps
understand the level of privacy intrusion, along with an experimental evaluation of a single
user in a real-world environment with real interactions and activities. We focus on location
and emotional features that relate to the privacy of the person, however, we plan to include
in our future work, other dimensions of privacy intrusion, including finance, genealogy and
health data. The key novelties of this paper include:
1. Quantification and experimental validation of privacy intrusion from smart home sensor
data learning, and
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2. A dataset of smart home sensor monitoring labeled with location and emotion privacy
features.
4.1.1 Privacy Concerns and Dimensions
Outlined in Figure. 4.1 is the list of devices in a smart home that collect data of various
kinds. Available in Figure. 4.2 is the list of aspects of privacy that can be estimated or
conjectured by creatively combining data collected from all the smart devices. For instance,
higher energy consumption readings on the smarthub showing video workload patterns along
with sitting at the desk could potentially infer the individual watching a video. The time of
the show and the duration could throw light on the type of show the individual is watching.
From an analysis of the transcribed speech from the audio assistants, the emotional state of
the user could potentially be derived along with possible locations the user could be in, based
on the conversations and/or calendar entries. The list already shows that through simple
intuitive conjectures it may be possible to intrude a person’s privacy, where predictions are
moving from mere convenience to making a user’s behavioral, emotional, social and medical
patterns extremely vulnerable to exact duplication by predictive systems.
Figure (4.1) A subset of current day smart home devices
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Figure (4.2) A sample of privacy concerning inferences potentially derivable from smart home
sensors.
We conducted a survey of threat perception questions across 6 privacy dimensions listed
in Appendix A. Figure. 4.3 outlines the threat perception results by dimension. The actual
survey result numbers are available in Appendix A. It is important to note that the perception
of threat is very high when the users are aware of a system using all the data being collected
but is low when just made aware of all the data being collected with sensors. It is very likely
the sensors are associated with convenience than threat unless made aware of. This survey
validates the importance of understanding the privacy concerns and its implications.
Figure (4.3) Threat Perception by Privacy Dimension
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4.1.2 Related Work
We discuss related works from areas of privacy intrusion detection techniques based on
traffic patterns, privacy profiling techniques and tools, contextual analysis and Emotional
dimensional analysis.
Privacy Intrusion detection techniques based on traffic profiling and mitiga-
tion Abbas Acar et. al. [34], demonstrate how machine learning methods based on traffic
profiling of smart home IoT device communications can be used by an adversary to automat-
ically identify actions and activities of the IoT devices and its users in a victims smart home
with very high accuracy, even if only encrypted data are available. Noah Apthorpe et al.
[35] demonstrate that an ISP or other network observer can infer privacy sensitive in-home
activities by analyzing Internet traffic from smart homes containing commercially-available
IoT devices even when the devices use encryption and evaluate strategies for mitigating the
privacy risks associated with smart home device traffic, including blocking, tunneling, and
rate shaping. Bogdon Copos et. al, [36] study two popular smart home devices, the Nest
Thermostat and the wired Nest Protect (i.e. smoke and carbon dioxide detector) and show
that traffic analysis can be used to learn potentially sensitive information about the state
of a smart home. They show with a high degree of confidence when the thermostat transi-
tions between the Home and Auto Away mode and vice versa, based only on network traffic
originating from the devices. Noah Apthorpe et. al., [37] outline smart home IoT devices
presenting privacy challenges within the home. The focus is on Internet service providers or
neighborhood WiFi eavesdroppers measuring Internet traffic rates from smart home devices
and inferring consumers private in-home behaviors. There are four strategies proposed for
device manufacturers and third parties to protect consumers from side-channel traffic rate
privacy threats; blocking traffic, concealing DNS, tunneling traffic and shaping and injecting
traffic. Noah Apthorpe et. al, [38] demonstrate that a passive network observer can infer
private in-home activities by analyzing Internet traffic from commercially available smart
home devices even when the devices use end-to-end transport-layer encryption.
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Privacy profiling tools and techniques Eric Zeng et.al, [39] conduct in-depth,
semi-structured interviews with fifteen smart home users, studying how and why they use
smart home technologies, their mental models, their security and privacy concerns and the
mitigation strategies they employ. They find that most users are not concerned even as
they are aware of the concerns. From these findings, they make some recommendations for
the designs of future smart home platforms and devices. Earlence Fernandes et. al, [40]
conduct in-depth empirical security analysis of the Samsung-owned SmartThings emerging
smart home programming platform. They exploit framework design flaws to construct four
proof-of-concept attacks related to stealing door lock codes, disabling vacation mode of the
home and inducing a fake fire alarm. Djamel Djenouri et. al. [41] reviews 2 ML classes,
the first using activity recognition based on traffic analysis and the second using energy
profiling, an approach similar to our energy consumption profiling for Localization analysis.
Rixin Xu et. al. [42], analyzed the workflows of several 3rd-party platforms and found
that they share similarities in their potential to monitor a users daily life by obtaining the
states of devices that are not related to any apps, by getting redundant state records and
by continuously receiving measurements from sensors. The analysis was done in depth for
SmartThings due to the large user base it has. Researchers at Princeton University have
built a web app [43] that lets you (and them) spy on your smart home devices to see what
they are up to. The open source tool, called IoT Inspector is a simple tool for consumers
to analyze the network traffic of their Internet connected gizmos. Researchers at Gizmodo
conducted experiments with data collected from Smart Home devices [44] over a period of 2
months. These devices ranged from personal toothbrushes to televisions and coffee makers.
In addition to helping understand the usage patterns and habits of users, they all had one
thing in common, they were all sharing information they collected with the manufacturers.
All this information collected in the guise of providing recommendations has clearly crossed
the line from convenience into intrusion.
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Contextual Analysis of Privacy Noah Apthorpe et. al [45] create a scalable survey
method based on the Contextual Integrity (CI) privacy framework that can quickly and effi-
ciently discover privacy norms. CI is a well established theory that defines privacy norms as
the generally accepted appropriateness of specific information exchanges in specific contexts.
The formulation makes it possible to thoroughly investigate the contextual information flows
and associated privacy norms. Understanding them will allow manufacturers to design de-
vices that consumers are comfortable incorporating into their homes and help government
regulators and consumer advocates identify and contextualize privacy violations. Serena
Zheng et. al [46], through surveys and empirical evidence provide evidence that users evalu-
ations of privacy risks from IoT devices are based on stereotypical views of these entities and
do not account for modern inference techniques applied to non-audio/visual data. It provides
qualitative descriptions of user thought processes and highlights convenience and trust as
driving factors in users decisions about incorporating IoT devices into their home. It syn-
thesizes survey responses into recommendations for IoT device manufacturers, researchers,
regulators, and industry standards bodies.
Emotional Dimension Analysis Iris Bakker et. al. [47] show that the three di-
mensions pleasure, arousal and dominance can be linked to the ABC Model of Attitudes:
Affective, Behavioural and Cognitive (ABC) aspects. In addition, connecting the three di-
mensions to the triad feeling, thinking and acting, can also help to improve our understand-
ing, interpretation and measurement of pleasure, arousal and dominance. Sven Buechel et.
al. [48] describe a corpus of 10k English sentences balancing multiple genres, with annotated
dimensional emotion metadata in the Valence-Arousal-Dominance (V/A/D) representation
format. It is a large scale text corpus that builds on the V/A/D model of emotion. The
National Research Council(NRC) Valence, Arousal, and Dominance (V/A/D) Lexicon [49]
includes a list of more than 20,000 English words and their valence, arousal, and dominance
scores. For a given word and a dimension (V/A/D), the scores range from 0 (lowest V/A/D)
to 1 (highest V/A/D). The lexicon with its fine-grained real-valued scores was created by
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manual annotation through surveys.
While traffic analysis patterns and profiling tools provide an external view into the lives
of individuals, the contextual and emotional dimension analysis can provide internal and
intricate models that capture aspects of privacy of an individual. Our contribution in this
paper through the study on privacy intrusion along Localization and Emotional dimensions
using actual sensor data payloads include (i) a mechanism to learn rules combining data
from multiple sensors, (ii) a framework to predict an individual’s localization and emotional
posture based on those generated rules and (iii) an evaluation of the effectiveness of the rule
generation and prediction mechanisms.
4.2 Privacy Dimensional Modeling
Figure (4.4) Our SmartHome Privacy Invasion Experimental Framework
As we design a mechanism to study privacy intrusion by learning through sensor data
in a user’s context, one of the key observations is that data from any one sensor may not be
sufficient to predict any of the activities or characteristics of a person. Any mechanism that
would aim to reverse engineer the privacy attribute from sensor data would need a way to
combine data from multiple sources creatively to arrive at patterns or rules. The framework
outlined in Figure. 4.4 aims to effectively combine data from multiple smart devices to arrive
at predictions. The effectiveness of these predictions translates to well someone’s privacy
53
posture can be duplicated. We begin by understanding the key privacy attributes we target
from the sensor data.
• Localization within the smart space: This involves posture, internal position in the
office or home, the activity one is involved in, the posture and one’s disposition at any
point in time. The specific activities that can be tracked are sitting at one’s work desk,
pacing around in the smart space, standing at a board for discussion, brainstorming
with collegues, working from home instead of the office, having lunch, watching videos
as part of work and watching videos.
• Emotional Analysis: This involves understanding the emotional state of the individual;
if he/she is happy, sad, angry or disgusted.
4.2.1 Localization Overview
The Localization measurement begins with a rule learning methodology that can derive
patterns and rules from a given data set. The Rule Learning workflow has 3 main steps
as outlined in Figure. 4.5, Retrieve data, FrequencyDiscretization and RuleLearner. The
first step, ”Retrieve” accesses the data from its source to load into the dataflow engine that
feeds into the FrequencyDiscretization block. The second step, ”FrequencyDiscretization”
converts the selected numerical attributes into nominal attributes by discretizing the numer-
ical attributes into a user-specified number of bins. This step is necessary as most of the
tree learning schemes work less efficiently for numerical attributes. As outlined in [50], the
goal of discretization is to reduce the number of values a continuous variable assumes by
grouping them into a number of intervals or bins. There are 2 unsupervised discretization
techniques common for most datasets as outlined in [51]. ”Equal-width discretization” first
finds the minimum and maximum values of every variable, Xi, and then divides this range
into a number, mXi, of user-specified, equal-width intervals whereas ”Equal-frequency dis-
cretization” determines the minimum and maximum values of the variable, sorts all values
in ascending order, and divides the range into a user-defined number of intervals, in such
a way that every interval contains the equal number of sorted values. This is illustrated
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in Figure. 4.6. The third step, ”RuleLearner” learns a pruned set of rules from the given
dataset. The Rule learner works similar to ’Repeated Incremental Pruning to Produce Error
Reduction’ (RIPPER) [52]. Starting with the less prevalent classes, the algorithm grows it-
eratively and prunes rules until there are no positive examples left or the error rate is greater
than 50%. In the growing phase, for each rule greedily conditions are added to the rule until
it is perfect (i.e. 100% accurate). The procedure tries every possible value of each attribute
and selects the condition with highest information gain. In the prune phase, for each rule
any final sequences of the antecedents is pruned with the pruning metric p/(p+n).
Figure (4.5) Model to learn the rules from the dataset
Figure (4.6) Numerical To Categorical Binning/Discretization
Rule learners are often compared to Decision Tree learners. Rule Learners have the
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advantage that they are easy to understand, representable in first order logic and prior
knowledge can be added to them easily. The major problem with Decision Trees is overfitting
i.e. the model works very well on the training set but does not perform well on the validation
set while the above Rule Learner based on the RIPPER algorithm overcomes that constraint.
4.2.2 Emotional Dimension Overview
Voice assistants and internal video cameras can be extremely intrusive as they listen
and see everything. Once these are translated to real emotions, multiple aspects could be
targeted at people based on their emotions. In the current work, the voice assistant has been
simulated with a program that listens to all conversations, translates them to plain text and
converts them to a sentiment, optimistic, negative or anxious. Correlation with additional
indicators like facial expression detection, eating habits, etc. help in accurately assessing
the emotional state of a person. A person being bored or thoughtful is detected by patterns
of pacing around or watching videos, and the emotional dimensional analysis done using
voice data. As the activities increase and our interactions with the external world increases,
multiple domains like financial transactions or social interactions have a huge impact on
the emotional state of a person. This work aims to drive a deeper understanding of the
privacy intrusion into the emotional state of a person through a dimensional analysis of the
emotional state.
Models of emotion are commonly subdivided along categorical or dimensional lines. Di-
mensional models consider states to be described relative to a small number of independent
emotional dimensions: Valence (corresponding to the concept of polarity), Arousal (degree
of calmness or excitement), and Dominance (perceived degree of control over a situation);
the V/A/D model. Formally, the V/A/D dimensions span a three-dimensional real-valued
vector space as illustrated in [48]. Another articulation of the dimensions is: valence(V): op-
timistic/pleasure negative/displeasure, arousal(A): active/stimulated sluggish/bored, dom-
inance(D): powerful/strong powerless/weak. An example V/A/D emotion chart is shown
in Figure. 4.7 as referenced in [53].
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Figure (4.7) V/A/D Example - NRC Research Ethics Board (NRC-REB)
Alternatively, categorical models, such as the six Basic Emotions conceptualize emotions
as discrete states. As far as categorical models for emotion analysis are concerned, many
studies use incompatible subsets of category systems, which limits their comparability and
there is still no consensus on a set of fundamental emotions. Here, the V/A/D model has
a major advantage: Since the dimensions are designed as being independent, results remain
comparable dimension-wise even in the absence of others (e.g., Dominance).
We will use 2 data banks for the Emotional dimension analysis. The first one is Emobank
[48], a corpus of 10000 sentences with V, A, and D values associated with each from actual
surveys, and also, to the best of our knowledge, the largest corpus for dimensional emotion
models. The second one is the NRC V/A/D Lexicon [49], a corpus of 20000 words with
V, A and D values from actual surveys. Addressing several genres and domains of general
English was one of the main criteria for the Emobank corpus and the genres represented by
it are illustrated in Figure. 4.8. Our goal with this analysis is to assess how close we can
gauge one’s emotional state based on sentences heard by the voice assistants.
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Figure (4.8) Genre distribution of the EMOBANK corpus
Training Mode Both Emobank and NRC V/A/D lexicon are used to train the sys-
tem. To understand how the V/A/D values in the word corpus relate to the V/A/D values
in the sentence corpus, we tokenize the sentence and extract the V/A/D values for each word
in the sentence and take the min, max and avg function of the values. The function that is
closest to the actual V/A/D value of the sentence is chosen to calculate the V/A/D value of
the sentence during validation and testing. The series of steps used to train the system to
calibrate the emotional dimensions are outlined in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Valence-Arousal-Dominance Derivation Algorithm
// Algorithm derives sentences V/A/D values using Word Lexicon V/A/D values
Data: EmoBank Sentence Corpus with actual V/A/D values
Data: NRC Word Lexicon with actual V/A/D values
Result: Sequence for the derivation of V/A/D values
Result: Function choice for V/A/D derivation
foreach sentences do
Tokenize a sentence foreach Tokens of a sentence do
Extract the V/A/D values from the NRC Word Lexicon
end
Calculate Sum, Avg, Min, Max of V/A/D values
end
foreach Sum, Avg, Min, Max data series do
Calcuate difference between this series from Actual V/A/D values
Derive Mean and Standard Deviation for this series
end
Choose the function with the lowest Mean and Std deviation (as that function has the least
deviation from the actual V/A/D values) as illustrated in Figure. 4.9
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Figure (4.9) Function Choice for Dimensions of Emotion
Validation and Test Modes The series of steps used to validate emotional dimen-
sions are outlined in Algorithm[ 3]. It uses the below set of threshold rules to convert the
tuple <V, A, D> into one of the Emotional dimensions; Optimistic, Anxious and Nega-
tive.The range of values for V, A and D is 0 to 1.
• If V >= 0.5, dimension = Optimistic
• If V < 0.5 and A >= 0.5, dimension = Anxious
• If V < 0.5 and A < 0.5, dimension = Negative
The data set is created by having an AI system translate all voice content captured
from voice assistants and audio recorders at home to text. The series of steps used in test
mode are similar to the ones outlined in algorithm 3 except that the actual dimensions are
already given as an output of the surveys.
4.3 Privacy Intrusion Quantification
We evaluate our system for its ability to detect privacy threats with high accuracy.
We conduct evaluations by analyzing data from a multi-sensor setup in an office sensor
deployment. In the setup, we have orchestrated scenarios to simulate privacy intrusion on a
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Algorithm 3 Valence-Arousal-Dominance Validation /Test Sequence
// Algorithm validates sentence V/A/D values using Word Lexicon V/A/D values
Data: EmoBank Sentence Corpus with actual V/A/D values
Data: NRC Word Lexicon with actual V/A/D values
Result: Validation of V/A/D values
Result: Derivation of Emotional Dimension; Optimistic, Anxious, Negative
foreach sentences do
Tokenize a sentence foreach Tokens of a sentence do
Extract the V/A/D values from the NRC Word Lexicon
end
Calculate Avg of V/A/D values
end
Categorize Actual V/A/D values into dimensions using dimension threshold rules.
Categorize computed V/A/D values into dimensions using dimension threshold rules.
single individual. Initially, we collect data and learn the Rules through our workflow using
all the data collected over a week. Once all the Rules are available, we validate that against
a validation dataset derived from the same setup, but over a different week with a new set
of activities for that week. The effectiveness of the rules in predicting the localization and
emotional posture of an individual gives us an idea of the level of intrusion for the individual.
4.3.1 Experimental Setup and Methodology
Localization and Emotional analysis are the areas of focus for these experiments and
the various sensors have been arranged in the office room as shown in Figure. 4.10 and
Figure. 4.11. A wifi router acts as a gateway node and helps isolate this network of sensors
from the rest of the enterprise network. The office room has been used for the setup in lieu of
home as it is easier to choreograph and generate data during the week. During the first week
of data generation, the setup was tuned to ensure that all devices and device placements
were fully calibrated.
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Figure (4.10) Image of the Office room setup with Activities
• Temperature sensor: A temperature sensor [54] (sampling in oC) has been integrated
with a RaspberryPi 3 node. It measures temperature with 1oC accuracy and samples
temperature every minute. The sensor has been placed on the arm rest of the chair so
that it can detect a person sitting on the chair in front of the desk, clearly detecting
when someone is working at the desk.
• Touch sensor: A RaspberryPi 3 node has been integrated with a Touch sensor. The
sensor, a low-power metal touch switch module of jog type [55] is a type of switch
that only operates when it’s touched by a charged body. The sensor sends a signal
asynchronously every time it is touched. The sensor has been placed under the mat in
front of the discussion whiteboard so that it can detect a person standing in front of
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the whiteboard during discussions.
• Motion sensor: A RaspberryPi 3 node has been integrated with a Motion sensor.
It is an infrared(IR) Obstacle Avoidance sensor [56] that uses the infrared reflection
principle to detect obstacles. When there is no object in front, the infrared receiver
receives no signals; when there is an object ahead which blocks and reflects the infrared
light, the infrared receiver will receive signals.The sensor sends a signal asynchronously
every time it detects motion. The sensor has been placed at the edge of the desk so it
can send a signal every time someone walks by the desk. If one is pacing in the office,
it keeps sending signals detecting the scenario.
• Electric Power consumption: The Smartplug, TPLink HS110 [57] helps measure the
power consumption in the office room. The power fluctuates as device connections to
the smartplug vary. The more the number of devices, higher the power consumption
and as devices disconnect, the power consumption drops. In addition to the number
of devices, the workloads that run on those devices determines the power consumption
as well. When we run heavy workloads or watch video streams on the laptop, the
power consumption increases noticeably. The power consumption differences can be
interestingly used to find when someone came to the office, when devices were con-
nected, when someone started executing some programs and when someone switched
to watching video streams. This metric can be extremely intrusive to one’s digital life.
• Voice Assistant: Alexa or Google Home or Google assistant can be very intrusive as
they listen to everything. This has been emulated with a program that listens to
all conversations, translates them to plain text and converts them to an emotional
dimensional score.
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Figure (4.11) Image of sensors across the Office room
A wifi router acts as a gateway node and helps isolate the network from the rest of
the enterprise network. All the above sensors are isolated in this network while at the same
time physically interfacing with all devices and things connected to a completely different
network.
We had 3 rounds of data collection and analysis. The first week, we collected data
from 8:30 am to 5:30 pm everyday from Monday to Friday. As the sensors and collection
frequencies were not fully calibrated or fine tuned, this was just a trial that helped us
test our constraints. The activities were randomized to ensure an equitable distribution
through the day. A snapshot of the schedule of activities is shown in Figure. 4.12. Based
on this randomized schedule of daily activities, we learned a few aspects that helped us
tune our setup in the second round (i) Data collected was sparse for any meaningful results
(ii) Sampling rate required for all data points on the machine learning setup (iii) Bias in
activities when conducting experiments and removal of those data points during controlled
experiments. During the second week, we collected data again through the entire day for
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a whole week with the sensors fully calibrated and tuned. Like any normal office week,
there were a lot of activities, some similar and some different, enough to create patterns,
association rules and outliers. This week corresponded to the Training phase. We collected
an additional 2 weeks of data later to add to this Training data set. So, effectively the
training data set comprised 3 weeks of data spread across a wider time range. To measure
the effectiveness of our approach, we generated the validation dataset, 2 week’s worth of
data with the same setup spread across a few weeks, but with a completely different set of
activities and schedules, typical of the differing work weeks at office. The data was again
collected over the entire day from 8:30 am to 5:30 pm everyday for the week. Also, one thing
to note is that the Voice assistant emulation that translated all voice to texts was used in
these experiments as that pertains more to the detection of emotions.
Figure (4.12) Training Schedule
4.3.2 Rule based Localization Evaluation
Training Phase: Rule Learning All data collected during the Training phase is
shown in Figure. 4.13. The sensors are synchronously sampled almost every minute while
some of the sensors like Touch and Motion asynchronously reported data whenever an event of
interest occurred. The scenarios that the measurements were correlated to for the individual
were
• Sitting at the desk working
• Standing at the whiteboard having a discussion
• Pacing around the room
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• Working from home instead of the office
• Watching videos
Figure (4.13) Ground Truth (Partial) collected during the Training/Learning process
The data collected during the learning process generated the following rules.
• Person is sitting: If Temperature in [33.762 - INF] then YES; If Motion in [-INF -
0.343] and At lunch = NO and if Electricity in [78.964 - 81.354]
• Person is standing at the board for a discussion: If Temperature in [INF - 26.46]
then YES; If Motion in [-INF - 0.343] and At lunch = NO and if Electricity in [78.964
- 81.354]
• Person is pacing around the room: If Sitting at Desk = YES then NO; Else if
Motion in [0.695 - INF] and Touch in [0.357 - 0.610] then YES; Else if Electricity in
[-INF - 78.789] and Touch in [-INF - 0.348] then YES
• Person is working from home: If Electricity less than 20, Sitting at Desk = NO,
Pacing About = NO, Standing = NO and On Friday, after 3:30 pm, YES
• Person is watching videos If Pacing About = NO, and Sitting = YES, and Elec-
tricity greater than 83, then YES
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Validation Phase: Office Dataset Analysis A snapshot of data collected during
the Validation phase is shown in Figure. 4.14. Once the rules are run against the valida-
tion data, inferences are generated and we measure the effectiveness of our privacy threat
identification mechanism through precision, recall and accuracy metrics, as defined below.
• Accuracy = TruePositives+TrueNegatives
TotalObservations
• Precision = TruePositives
TruePositives+FalsePositives
• Recall = TruePositives
TruePositives+FalseNegatives
Figure (4.14) Ground Truth (Partial) collected during the Validation process
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Figure (4.15) Evaluation of the Smarthome privacy across Localization parameters
We make an observation from the table in Figure. 4.15. For the scenario of ”Standing at
the whiteboard for discussions”, the precision was low due to the way the touch sensor was
placed near the whiteboard that could be activated by other weights in addition to the weight
of the individual, sometimes thus triggering False Positives. The Recall was high indicating
that whenever an individual stood at the whiteboard, it had very few False Negatives. Better
adjustment of the touch sensor near the whiteboard in the experimental setup will fix the
low Precision readings.
4.3.3 V/A/D based Emotional Evaluation
Training Phase: V/A/D Function Choice As outlined in Section 3.2, Emobank
[48], a corpus of 10000 sentences with V, A, and D values and NRC V/A/D Lexicon [49],
a corpus of 20000 words with V, A and D values are used during the training phase.
Using this we arrive at the choice of the function for V/A/D derivation for sentences using
individual V/A/D scores for words from the Lexicon as illustrated in Figure. 4.9. The
function determining the V/A/D of the sentence could be one of Min, Max or Avg of the
V/A/D values of the words in the sentence. This will help with identifying the emotional
state of a person along the 3 dimensions:
• Optimistic: Joy, Surprise
• Anxious: Anger, Disgust
• Negative: Fear, Sadness
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Validation Phase: EmoBank dataset analysis Validation phase uses the partial
EmoBank dataset. We measure the effectiveness of our privacy threat identification system
through precision, recall and accuracy metrics, as previously defined. There are a couple
of key points to note from the results in Figure. 4.16. First, all emotional dimensions are
identified with a high level of accuracy. Second, the dataset had more data on the Optimistic
dimension than others. This reflects reality as most data is normal or optimistic unless
negative or anxious moments change that.
Figure (4.16) Results for the Emobank Validation Dataset
Testing Phase: Survey dataset analysis Testing phase uses data collected by
voice assistants and converted to text. From all the voice/text collected, 52 sentences across
multiple topics were chosen and subjected to a survey across 30 participants to classify them
into Optimistic, Anxious and Negative dimensions. We did not collect the age, gender and
occupation of the person, however, based on our estimates, we believe the demographic
spread over ages 25-45, considering all the survey participants were employees of a company
and/or senior graduate students. The dataset and the survey are available at [58] and the ac-
tual dimensional classification based on survey, or rather people’s perception of the sentences
is shown in Figure. 4.17. The actual survey result numbers are available in Appendix B. At
this point, it is run through our algorithm to derive the V/A/D scores and classify into the 3
dimensions based on V/A/D values. Based on actual and derived V/A/D values, accuracy,
precision and recall are calculated to assess effectiveness.
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Figure (4.17) Emotion Survey Dataset Characterization
Figure (4.18) Results for the Survey Dataset
4.4 Takeaways and Future work
A lot of privacy concerns exist in the Smart Home segment and we have categorized
them into multiple dimensions with each one having a different level of severity in case of a
breach. For instance, Financial category and Identity thefts are higher in priority than most
other dimensions. In this work, we have taken two of those categories, ”Localization” and
”Emotional State” and tracked an individual through all scenarios, like sitting and working at
his/her desk, standing at the whiteboard for a discussion, pacing around the room, being at
lunch, working from home or watching some videos while at the desk, being Optimistic(happy
and surprise), being Anxious(anger and disgust) and being Negative(Sadness and Fear).
Anyone having a good grasp of an individual’s medical needs, or emotional mood swings, or
daily activities and specific localization details, can target him/her from multiple angles for
nefarious reasons. Based on the above methodology, as we are able to track activities with
an accuracy of 76%, and high levels of Precision(62%) and Recall(53%), and track emotional
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states with an accuracy of 86% and high level of Precision(79%) and Recall(79%), we can
start to find some interesting patterns crossing dimensional boundaries. For instance, if one
is Negative and Pacing around, the person is extremely disturbed and is deep in thought.
Any kind of prediction is bad considering the level of intrusion that exists in each of the
parameters and these numbers could be interpreted as the risk factor. This was achieved by
having various sensors track all these activities. Anyone getting this level of detail on any
individual is clearly intruding on the individual’s privacy. Our mechanisms help quantify
the level of intrusion and the study outlines their effectiveness in predicting the various
aspects of the privacy posture. These results from our analysis of this preliminary
dataset show the possibility of invading a user’s privacy through inference with
significant accuracy.
As next steps, we will conduct structured interviews of 20 smart home users, to study
their usage patterns of these smart home technologies and their privacy concerns. This study
would help assign weights to the various privacy attributes. Associating different weights to
different categories and scenarios would help tune individual privacy intrusion scores and in
turn the mitigation levels and methodologies to be adopted.
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PART 5
CONCLUSION
The framework for Collaborative Edge Computing, Opportunistic collaborative resource
sharing for mobile IoT systems, drives a novel architecture that uses blockchains for collab-
oration. We developed a mechanism that enables opportunistically identifying available
resources and advertised services, and invoke or utilize them based on a collaborative con-
sensus. Through an experimental evaluation, we showed the feasibility of the collaborative
architecture with overall app execution latency comparable to the traditional centralized
edge approach and resource utilization much better.
The framework for Collaborative Edge Security addresses the problem of detecting in-
tegrity threats from physical attacks on sensor nodes, through a use-case exploration of preci-
sion agriculture scenarios. We designed a novel framework that uses Local Outlier Factor for
outlier detection with locality based mean and variance used as dimensions, and described its
usage across typical precision agriculture sensor deployment topologies. Through experimen-
tal evaluation and trace based analysis of a subset of data from the real world underground
sensor deployment (Thoreau), we showed the effectiveness of the model in detecting integrity
threats with reasonable accuracy and efficiency suitable for real-time deployment.
The framework for Collaborative Privacy Intelligence explored the idea of privacy profil-
ing of individuals in the Smarthome setting. We designed the privacy intrusion measurement
framework to understand the correlation of activities to the physical world of sensors and
digital assistants and the patterns across multiple activities. We used this to combine data
from smart home sensors, duplicate a user’s privacy posture, and quantify the level of pri-
vacy intrusion based on a generated rule-book. Through an experimental setup of a 5 sensor
network, we showed the feasibility of deriving Localization and Emotional postures from
sensors’ data and demonstrated the effectiveness of the approach.
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As part of our ongoing research efforts, we plan to explore our collaborative edge-
computing approach at scale in a 5G mobile IoT platform and our collaborative security
with the novel outlier detection approach at scale with another domain that exhibits spatio-
temporal characteristics. With respect to Collaborative Intelligence, we plan to assign
weights to various privacy attributes to help us tune the privacy posture better and drive
the right mitigation strategies. As the Edge gains prominence with decisions and computa-
tion moving closer to the source of data, the frameworks designed through this thesis will
drive key solutions at the Edge and will pave the way for more research in federation and
collaboration of mobile Internet of Things devices at the Edge in various domains.
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Appendix A
SURVEY: THREAT PERCEPTION BY PRIVACY DIMENSIONS
• Localization: Does an AI system that identifies if you are sitting/standing in a
room/home seem to invade your privacy?
• Localization: Does an AI system that identifies if you are moving/not moving in a
room/home seem to invade your privacy?
• Localization: Does an AI system that identifies if you are at home or at work seem to
invade your privacy?
• Identity: Does an AI system that identifies your daily habits seem to invade your
privacy?
• Identity: Does an AI system that identifies your driving habits seem to invade your
privacy?
• Identity: Does an AI system that recognizes your social identity seem to invade your
privacy?
• Emotion: Does an AI system that identifies that you are happy or surprised (very
positive) seem to invade your privacy?
• Emotion: Does an AI system that identifies that you are sad or fearful (very negative)
seem to invade your privacy?
• Emotion: Does an AI system that identifies that you are angry or disgusted (very
anxious) seem to invade your privacy?
• Finance: Does an AI system that identifies your online banking patterns seem to invade
your privacy?
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• Finance: Does an AI system that identifies the banks you deal with, seem to invade
your privacy?
• Finance: Does an AI system that recognizes the banking identities, seem to invade
your privacy?
• Genealogy: Does an AI system that recognizes the ancestral history seem to invade
your privacy?
• Genealogy: Does an AI system that recognizes the race of a person seem to invade
your privacy?
• Genealogy: Does an AI system that recognizes the descent of a person seem to invade
your privacy?
• Social Connections: Does an AI system that identifies a person’s social connections
seem to invade your privacy?
• Social Connections: Does an AI system that recognizes the intensity and nature of
social connections seem to invade your privacy?
• Social Connections: Does an AI system that recognizes the frequency and mode of
social interactions seem to invade your privacy?
• Sensors: Does the presence of a touch sensor at home seem to invade your privacy?
• Sensors: Does the presence of a motion sensor at home seem to invade your privacy?
• Sensors: Does the presence of a temperature sensor at home seem to invade your
privacy?
• Sensors: Does the presence of a smartplug that measures granular energy usage at
home seem to invade your privacy?
• Sensors: Does the presence of a voice assistant at home seem to invade your privacy?
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Figure (A.1) Results of the Privacy Intrusion Importance survey
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Appendix B
83
SURVEY: EMOTIONAL DIMENSION CLASSIFICATION
Figure (B.1) Results of the Emotional Dimension Classification survey
